Category Archives: evidence

Objective consideration of the results of the investigation

That Andreas Lubitz caused the crash of the Germanwings plane on 24 March 2015 in the French Alps on the flight from Barcelona to Düsseldorf is found in many news reports and is based upon the following allegations by the investigating bodies:

He had locked the cockpit door after the captain left the cockpit.
He would have been depressed and on sick leave on 24 March 2015.
He had searched an iPad for ways to commit suicide and researched cockpit access codes.
He had deliberately initiated the final descent of the Germanwings plane.

The attempt to verify these allegations are based on the more than 21,000 pages of investigation files of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor and the Marseille public prosecutor’s office as well as the BEA (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile) final report of the accident investigation.

The cockpit door that cannot be opened

In various reports on the Germanwings crash, it was said that the co-pilot had locked the cockpit door to lock out his colleague. In the BEA final report, German version, it is noted on page 38(1) that at the time of the pilot’s return the buzzer signal and another noise were recorded on the CVR (Cockpit Voice Recorder). However, the BEA final report clearly states that this other noise is not compatible with pilot manipulation of the cockpit door locking system. The BEA thus disproved that the pilot in the cockpit could have intentionally locked the door. The BEA goes on to make the statement in its final report that the pilot “did not open the cockpit door and thus prevented other persons from accessing the cockpit”(2).

The question arises, why did the pilot not open the cockpit door? In this context, page HA 04310 of the investigation file of the Germanwings crash documents demonstrates what the result of the CVR recording revealed with regard to the condition of the co-pilot present in the cockpit(3).

“Listening to the various recording channels revealed that breathing could be heard through the mouth microphones, which meant that he was alive, although it was not possible to prove whether he was also conscious.”

In his expert report on the Germanwings crash the author, journalist and aviation expert Tim van Beveren comes to the conclusion that the pilot was incapable of acting or was unconscious in the cockpit(4). In this case, however, the cockpit door can be opened by entering on the keypad a three-digit emergency code which every crew member knows. There were indications from Germanwings employees that the keypad of the aircraft involved in the accident had a defect that made it impossible to successfully enter the emergency code, and thus the cockpit door could not be opened despite any attempt to enter the code(5).

It should be noted that four microphones are recorded on the four tracks of the CVR. Each pilot has his own microphone attached to the headset. There is an area microphone, which picks up sounds and noises from the entire cockpit. And on the jumpseat (seat for an additional crew member) is another headset with microphone.
According to investigation file HA 05266, the allocation of tracks of the co-pilot and captain by officers of the Air Traffic Gendarmerie SRTA Paris Charles De Gaulle was as follows:

• “Track 1 corresponds to a high-quality recording of the last 30 minutes of the co-pilot’s headset.
• Track 2 corresponds to a high-quality recording of the last 30 minutes of the flight captain’s headset.”(6)

Accordingly, the investigation assigned track 1 to the co-pilot and track 2 to the captain. However, this clearly contradicts the Airbus manual, the Flight Crew Operating Manual and the Airbus wiring diagrams of the crashed Germanwings aircraft D-AIPX. This original Airbus wiring diagram clearly shows that

• the CVR track 1 is assigned to the captain and not to the co-pilot, and
• the CVR track 2 is assigned to the co-pilot and not to the captain.

This raises the question of who actually remained in the cockpit, the co-pilot or the captain? Voice identification with the captain’s wife and the co-pilot’s parents to clarify this discrepancy was never carried out.

The conclusion is that the co-pilot or captain did not manually activate the “lock function” for the cockpit door. He was incapacitated or unconscious in the cockpit. However, the captain or co-pilot was also unable to open the cockpit door by entering the emergency code because the keypad had a defect.

Was Andreas Lubitz depressed and on sick leave on March 24, 2015?

In December 2014, Andreas Lubitz noticed problems with his eyes and consulted various doctors. In keeping with his character, he not only sought the help of a doctor but always sought at least a second medical opinion.
His family doctor, who could not initially determine a cause, referred him to various eye specialists, but no eye disease could be found. The family doctor, therefore, developed the theory that it could be a psychosomatic illness and referred Andreas Lubitz to appropriate specialists, such as psychiatrists and psychologists. The psychiatrist who treated Andreas Lubitz for his depressive episode in 2008 and 2009 issued a specialist medical certificate on 29 January 2015, see page HA 10309(7) of the investigation file. It explicitly states:

“The patient named above appears to be completely healthy from a psychiatric point of view. There is no indication of a psychiatric disease. Regarding illness, Mr. Lubitz does not have a higher risk than the average population.”

However, the family doctor maintained her suspected diagnosis of a psychosomatic cause and wrote Andreas Lubitz off sick from 22.2.2015 to 24.2.2015 due to sleep and visual disturbances and finally initiated an appropriate examination and treatment in the direction of psychosis on 10.3.2015. For the periods of taking medication, Andreas Lubitz had a corresponding certificate of incapacity to work, which he also presented to his employer.

The family doctor issued a certificate of incapacity for work from 12.3.2015 to 30.3.2015 on 12.3.2015. By 18.3.2015, however, the situation had not improved. The family doctor was on vacation and so Andreas Lubitz went to the practice of the substitute doctor. This substitute doctor ended the erroneous treatment in the direction of psychosomatic illness, phased out the medication and wrote Andreas Lubitz off sick for this phasing-out period from 18.3.2015 to 22.3.2015. The amended certificate of incapacity for work was dutifully handed over to the employer, Germanwings, on 18 March 2015, see HA 10594(8), certificate of incapacity for work for submission to the employer. The certificate of incapacity for work also bears the receipt stamp of Germanwings. A copy of the old certificate of incapacity to work until 30 March 2015, issued by the family doctor, was found torn up in Andreas Lubitz’s flat, see HA 09570(9), as it was now obsolete and was only intended to be presented to the health insurance company and not to the employer.

However, in the press conference of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office on 27 March 2015, public prosecutor Dr. Kumpa presented these investigation results as if Andreas Lubitz had not presented the certificate of incapacity for work to his employer but had destroyed it in order to conceal his illness. According to public prosecutor Dr. Kumpa, the torn certificate of incapacity for work found during the house search of the Düsseldorf flat was proof of this.

The bottom line, however, is that Andreas Lubitz did not hide his illness from his employer. This is clear from the documentation of the certificates of incapacity for work that had been duly submitted. Andreas Lubitz was last thoroughly examined by a general practitioner as late as 18.03.2015 and was given written sick leave up to and including 22.03.2015. Previously issued certificates for a longer period of time were thus obsolete. In addition, as a psychiatrist testified, Andreas Lubitz was neither suicidal nor suffering from any form of psychiatric illness.

The iPad search

In the press conferences held by the prosecutor of Düsseldorf, Dr. Kumpa, he mentioned that an iPad had been found with which Andreas Lubitz had searched for ways to commit suicide, medication information and also cockpit code access. However, the investigation file with its more than 21,000 pages refutes this statement by Dr. Kumpa.

According to the search and seizure protocol, see HA 09578(10), an iPad was seized during the search of Andreas Lubitz’s flat in Düsseldorf on 26 March 2015. In a file note, supplement to the police search on 26.03.2015, see HA 09581(11), it is stated that by mistake in the seizure report the number of iPads found and seized was listed as one (1). It is confirmed that the actual number of iPads was two (2). However, the criminal investigation department, which examined both iPads, found nothing “relevant to the proceedings” (HA 08916(12), HA 08910(13)), so both iPads were inconspicuous. One of the iPads belonged to Andreas Lubitz and the other to his partner.

According to HA 09803(14), Andreas Lubitz’s partner handed over another tablet or iPad to the Düsseldorf criminal investigation department after being questioned as a witness on 26 March 2015. Thus, there were now three iPads among the evidence at the Düsseldorf criminal investigation department. On this third iPad the Düsseldorf criminal investigation department found search terms such as “suicide”, “buy cyanide”, “chloroquine suicide” after reviewing the internet history on 18/19.03.2015, and that on 20.03.2015, among others, the keywords “code cockpit door” were searched for, see HA 08923(15).

According to the interrogation protocol, however, the criminal police did not question the partner about why the iPad was not found during the search of the joint flat; where it was at that time; where it was during the entire time in question when the search and seizures were carried out; and who had used it. The fact that the third iPad was not found during the search of the flat and was only handed over later by his partner makes it clear that the device was apparently not under the control of Andreas Lubitz nor had it been in his flat. Why was it not determined where the device was during the period in question? Who had the device from when to when? According to the investigation file, there is no evidence of an investigation.

Could it be that the search for the cockpit door access code was carried out by another person, inspired by a TV report on the current use of cockpit access codes (as also noted by the Criminal Investigation Department in the printout of the web searches on page HA 08930(16): “Report shows code for cockpit door on TV”)? Why should Andreas Lubitz look for cockpit door access code information on the internet, as he was certainly informed of it by his airline and therefore knew it anyway? Even if the two iPads directly seized during the home search did not have any contents relevant to the proceedings, the history of the use of these devices would be of crucial importance. If, for example, the iPad had been used by Andres Lubitz at the times when the third iPad, which was handed over later, was also used, then it would be ultimately clear that the third iPad was not used by Andreas Lubitz and that the online searches apparently incriminating him could not have been credited.

However, all these open questions were not comprehensively investigated and must therefore be considered unresolved. How can it be that the criminal investigation department as well as the public prosecutor’s office did not question the partner either on 26.3.2015 or later on the use and the user of the third iPad? Why was it not precisely clarified whether this iPad had been accessible to Andreas Lubitz at all? Why doesn’t the investigation file explicitly state where it was actually located between 3/16/2015 and 3/26/2015 and who was using it? Why does the investigation file not explicitly state when the other two iPads were used?

So how could the investigation simply arbitrarily assign this web history to Andreas Lubitz without having explored and verified the context of these searches? The criminal police and the public prosecutor’s office seem to have jumped to the conclusion, without any factual basis, that Andreas Lubitz would have operated the iPad during that time and carried out these searches without even remotely considering, checking and ruling out other possibilities.

The bottom line is that the conclusions of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office are devoid of any factual basis, i.e. they are pure conjecture and therefore completely worthless for evidentiary proceedings.

Who initiated the last descent of the D-AIPX?

In the BEA final report, German version of 13 March 2016, it is documented on page 13: “At 09:30:53 (point 4), the set altitude on the FCU (Flight Control Unit) changed from 38,000 ft to 100 ft within one second. This is the minimum value that can be set on the A320.”(17) It is assumed that the co-pilot caused the change in altitude by interfering with the FCU. To verify this, the transcript of the cockpit voice recorder protocol will be used. On the transcript of the cockpit voice recorder log, page HA 05280(18), at 09:30:53, there is no documented noise indicating an adjustment of the flight level at the aircraft controls. Thus, it is not documented that the co-pilot set the altitude at 100 feet. The reduction in altitude within one second from 38,000 ft to 100 ft at 09:30:53 must therefore have been implemented by the Flight Management System without manual intervention by a pilot. This phenomenon has already occurred several times before and after the Germanwings crash.

Extensively documented is an incident at the Australian airline Quantas, flight 72, on 7 October 2008. An Airbus A330, whose control interfaces are identical to the crashed Germanwings Airbus, was on a flight over the Indian Ocean to Perth, Western Australia. Suddenly and without warning it descended twice. In this incident 119 of the 315 passengers and crew on board were injured, 12 of them seriously, see Australian Transport Safety Bureau report “In-flight upset 154 km west of Learmonth, WA 7 October 2008 VH-QPAAirbus A330-303″(19)

As the Australian Transport Safety Bureau stated in its investigation, it is highly likely that defective data packets were sent via the data bus to the fly-by-wire electronic aircraft control system. This triggered the stall protection and the Airbus was sent without warning into descent by the Flight Management System. The three pilots on board were able to intervene and the aircraft continued the flight.

Another documented incident occurred on 19 March 2017. “On Mar 19th 2017 a Germanwings A319 enroute began an uncommanded descent two times.”(20)

The Germanwings Airbus A319-100 D-AGWG, equipped with the same flight control systems as the crashed Germanwings Airbus, twice went into a descent after several unexplained mode changes not initiated by the pilots. The intervention of the crew prevented the aircraft from descending further. These incidents demonstrate that Airbus aircraft can descend uncontrollably without warning and without human intervention in the aircraft controls. Disasters could only be prevented by the skilled intervention of pilots.

The conclusion is that it is highly probable that this phenomenon of uncontrolled descent also occurred on Germanwings flight 9525. Tragically, the pilot remaining in the cockpit was unable to act and the other pilot was unable to open the cockpit door to intervene. As a result, the Germanwings Airbus crashed in the French Alps.

Conclusion

If one analyses the four so-called facts, they do not stand up to factual scrutiny. This shows how superficially and inaccurately the investigations were conducted and how clear indications in another direction were overlooked or ignored with preconceived opinion.

L. G.

References

(1) Excerpt from page 38, BEA Final Report, German version of 13 March 2016
https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elyextendttnews/BEA2015-0125.de-LR_04.pdf
(2) Excerpt from page 122, BEA Final Report, German version of 13 March 2016
https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elyextendttnews/BEA2015-0125.de-LR_04.pdf
(3) Excerpt from page HA 04310 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(4) Excerpt from page 109, expert report of the crash of Germanwings flight 4U9525, Tim van Beveren
https://andreas-lubitz.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Gutachten-zum-Germanwings-Absturz-4U9525-S-61-120.pdf
(5) Excerpt from page 98, expert report of the crash of Germanwings flight 4U9525, Tim van Beveren
https://andreas-lubitz.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Gutachten-zum-Germanwings-Absturz-4U9525-S-61-120.pdf
(6) Excerpt from page HA 05266 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(7) Excerpt from page HA 10309 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(8) Excerpt from page HA 10594 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(9) Excerpt from page HA 09570 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(10) Excerpt from page HA 09578 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(11) Excerpt from page HA 09581 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(12) Excerpt from page HA 08916 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(13) Excerpt from page HA 08910 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(14) Excerpt from page HA 09803 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(15) Excerpt from page HA 08923 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(16) Excerpt from page HA 08930 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(17) Excerpt from page 13, BEA Final Report, German version of 13 March 2016
https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elyextendttnews/BEA2015-0125.de-LR_04.pdf
(18) Excerpt from page HA 05280 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(19) http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/3532398/ao2008070.pdf
(20) https://avherald.com/h?article=4aad6354&opt=0

References_Objective consideration of the results of the investigation

further posts:

What conclusions do the investigation results allow so far?

What conclusions do the investigation results allow so far?

Experience has shown that aircraft accident investigations take several years. In case of the Germanwings airplane crash in the French Alps the investigating prosecutor Brice Robin announced after only two days: The copilot deliberately crashed the aircraft. When the captain left the cockpit, the copilot initiated a descent. The copilot did not allow the captain to reenter the cockpit. Prior to these announcements there had been a first listening of the cockpit voice recorder by the French gendarmerie. However, to prove beyond doubt who, in fact, was in the cockpit a voice identification should have been carried out. In order to confirm the identity of the speakers the cockpit voice recorder data should have been played to the copilot’s parents and the captain’s wife. However, this was not done. Instead, it was assumed that the “strong” voice belonged to the captain and the “weak” voice was that of the copilot.

Therefore, it was presumed that it was the copilot who had locked out the captain.
Thus, intentional actions by the copilot were assumed. In reference to the pilot remaining in the cockpit, on page HA 04310 of the investigation report it is documented:

“Listening to the various recording channels revealed that breathing could be detected from a headset microphone, which means that he was alive, although there was no evidence that he was conscious.”

This means that there is no evidence of conscious or even deliberate actions, only that the recorded breathing showed that he was alive.

It was also assumed that the pilot remaining in the cockpit consciously and intentionally initiated the descent. However, the recordings do not reveal any sounds up to the moment of impact that would indicate a pilot’s active manipulations of the aircraft controls.

Various press articles reported that the copilot suffered from depression in 2015.
On page HA 10309 of the investigation file there is a medical certificate from January 29, 2015 – less than two months before the crash – in which the following is certified by a specialist in psychiatry and psychotherapy (see screenshot):

“The patient named above appears to be completely healthy from a psychiatric point of view. There is no indication of a psychiatric disease.
Regarding illness, Mr. Lubitz does not have a higher risk than the average population.”

By the constant repetitions of unsubstantiated allegations, large parts of the public have been convinced of the copilot’s guilt and his responsibility for the crash of the Germanwings aircraft. However, this is not reflected in the facts of the accessible investigation reports.

L.G.

further posts:

The cockpit door that cannot be opened

The cockpit door that cannot be opened

Missing evidence of the cockpit door not opening

It has been described not only in various reports on the Germanwings crash that a pilot had locked the cockpit door in order to lock out a colleague, but also in the official final report of the French investigation authority BEA. But has this ever been proven?

What was the cause of BEA’s final report on the cockpit door that cannot be opened? The following findings were documented there. On page 108/110, Appendix 3, letter from the BFU (German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation), the following statement is made regarding the actions of the pilot in the cockpit:

“did not unlock the cockpit door and therefore prevented access by other persons.”

https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elydbrapports/BEA2015-0125.en-LR.pdf

In this context, the question arises as to why the cockpit door was not opened. Because the pilot who remained in the cockpit didn’t want to let his colleague in? In the investigation file of the Germanwings crash, comprising more than 10,000 pages, the result of listening to the cockpit voice recorder related to the pilot is documented on page HA 04310:

“Listening to the different recording channels revealed that breathing was heard through the mouth microphones, which means that he was alive, but there was no evidence that he was conscious.”

That is, there was no evidence of conscious or deliberate action, just the assumption that he was alive because he was breathing.

The journalist and flight expert Mr. van Beveren investigated this issue in an expert report and addresses it on page 109.

https://andreas-lubitz.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Gutachten-zum-Germanwings-Absturz-4U9525-S-61-120.pdf

He used the cockpit voice recorder transcript to examine the pilot’s breathing after the cockpit door was locked. His finding: Within the next 20 seconds, the pilot’s breathing suddenly accelerates to hyperventilation. As musicians and air passengers, as well as cabin crew, know from experience, this can lead to unconsciousness in a very short time. The breathing then remains stable in this state of tachypnea. Tachypnea – rapid breathing – is the body’s desire for more oxygen and therefore causes an increased breathing rate. Experts speak of “acute” tachypnea if a person takes more than 20 breaths per minute.

The pilot’s breathing rate was 26 breaths per minute and remained constant over the entire period, even at times when, according to BEA’s theory, the pilot activated the autopilot with extremely brisk movements and with appropriate physical exertion. Physicians argue that even in a state of psychosis the unconscious reactions of the autonomic nervous system are preserved and do not cease. They conclude from this that the person was not in a state of psychosis, but in a state of incapacity or loss of consciousness.

It should also be noted that there are no further noise recordings up to the aircraft impact, which indicates that there was no active intervention by the pilot in controlling the aircraft control.

It is not evident from the investigation file that this fact of increased respiratory rate has been officially investigated by medical and psychological experts. So the question remains: Was the person remaining in the cockpit indeed conscious during the final 10 minutes of the flight? If not, this would be another possible explanation for why he didn’t open the cockpit door. This should have been investigated as part of a full inquiry!

In an emergency, the cockpit door can be opened using a special three-digit code. This emergency code, exclusive to the respective airline, is known to all crew members and is entered into a keypad. The question arises: Why could the other pilot not open the cockpit door with the emergency code? Mr. van Beveren examined this question in his report.

https://andreas-lubitz.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Gutachten-zum-Germanwings-Absturz-4U9525-S-61-120.pdf

He writes on page 98: “It was not discussed whether an investigation as to whether the keypad of the cockpit door on the day of the accident flight (or at any time in the past) had a defect. However, in the opinion of van Beveren, this is of fundamental importance, because shortly after the accident there were indications from Germanwings circles that this keypad had previously malfunctioned when trying to open the accidentally closed cockpit door while the aircraft was on the ground by entering the emergency code.”

Hence, the final question: Has the true state of consciousness of the pilot in the cockpit and the perfect functioning of the keypad really been determined?

L.G.

further posts:

What can we expect on the fifth anniversary?

What can we expect on the fifth anniversary?

Will new insights find their way into media coverage?

The fifth anniversary of the tragic and life-altering event of 24 March 2015 is coming up soon. It can be assumed that the media will publish reports regarding the catastrophe and the circumstances around it. The numerous reports of the past five years have nearly always included the following two key messages:

1. The co-pilot intentionally locked the cockpit door.
2. The co-pilot was depressed at the time of the crash.

However, over these intervening five years these statements have become untenable. As our readers know, we have indicated this in various articles on this website and provided the corresponding evidence.

Regarding point 1 above, it has not been proven that the co-pilot deliberately locked the cockpit door. For unknown reasons, the door was not opened (see link below).

https://andreas-lubitz.com/en/2018/08/ “The deliberate lockout of the captain from the cockpit”

Regarding point 2, according to the investigative findings of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor the co-pilot did not suffer from depression at the time of the crash (see link below).

https://andreas-lubitz.com/en/2019/01/ ” Current developments – Renewed lawsuit by families’ lawyer”

The statement by the renowned journalist and author Ulrich Wickert is absolutely remarkable:
“80 percent of the reports on the 27-year-old have been proven to be false” (see link below).

https://andreas-lubitz.com/en/2019/02/

Nonetheless, the press representatives have repeated these unsubstantiated claims in their reports like a prayer wheel, without incorporating new and contradictory information. We can infer that behind these repeated falsehoods there lies the clear intention to sustain the publicized image of “The Depressed Co-pilot Who Locked the Cockpit Door.” If journalists were to investigate the cumulative findings and incorporate them into their reports, they then would necessarily have to address the question: Could the cause of the crash have been different?

Doubts about the official version were raised in December 2019, when reports were released that the victims’ cell phones were returned to the families but with audio and video data deleted.

Further questions immediately arise: “Is there something to hide? And if so, what?”

Let us hope that on the fifth anniversary journalists will educate themselves with the current available information and move from the established storyline to a degree of enlightenment, which will lead to the objective reporting we expect from responsible media. A “No Comment” response from authorities does not entitle them to maintain the established storyline unrestrictedly and uncritically.

L.U.

further post:

Christmas peace 2019?

Christmas peace 2019?

In an interview, a victim’s relatives comment on the deleted cell phone data

A few days before Christmas, the largest German tabloid did not shy away from reporting again on the Germanwings crash on March 24, 2015. A victim’s family from the former East Germany, who had lost their adult son in the crash, was ready to comment on the subject of “deleted cell phone data,” and offered the son’s cell phone, found at the crash site, available for examination. The NAND memory – on which all the data of a mobile phone, such as SMS histories, photos, videos, and phone records are located – was removed from the device and deleted, as confirmed by an IT expert. The tabloid report raised the question of who had manipulated the cell phone (as well as those of the other crash victims) – and why.

The British crisis agency Kenyon was commissioned by Lufthansa to hand over the cell phones to the relatives after they had previously received the devices from the French investigation authorities. In other words, the phones first went to French authorities, then to Kenyon, and only then to victims’ relatives. To be thorough, the tabloid requested an explanation from the French investigative authorities regarding the deletion of the phone memories, but the request remains unanswered.

In an attempt at an explanation, victim lawyer Elmar Giemulla speculated that the recorded events of the final moments on board might have been too disturbing for the bereaved families. He must therefore be assuming that photo or video recordings by passengers indeed existed.

Well, the fact is that the relatives have not been spared in any way. The Marseille public prosecutor’s office invited victims and their lawyers to Paris on June 11, 2015. There they were shown a simulation from the pilot’s cockpit perspective to the point of impact. This simulation is said to have been accompanied by the original audio recordings from the cockpit voice recorder. According to media reports, the demonstration was so shocking for the relatives that about one in four of the around 200 people left the room.

It is interesting to contrast the simulation scenario with the aforementioned explanation about shielding the families from shocking cell phone images.

In this context, it must be mentioned that the French authorities have never provided the original data or copies from the cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder to either the German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation (BFU) or the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office. Several inquiries from the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office to the French investigative authorities regarding the release of the cockpit voice recorder have remained unanswered each time.

We must twice ask the question: “Why?”

First: Why was the cell phone data irretrievably deleted?

Second: Why have the German investigation authorities never received the original recordings from the cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder?

Deleted cell phone data and missing original recordings – Why?

L.U.

further post:

How aware were the passengers on Germanwings flight 4U9525 of the impending crash?

How aware were the passengers on Germanwings flight 4U9525 of the impending crash?

Our reaction to the most recent press reports about the Essen lawsuit for higher pain and suffering compensation

Whether the letters from Lufthansa were a statement to the Essen district court or to the plaintiff survivors eludes our knowledge. The fact is that on 12 and 13 August 2019 there were extensive press releases by the leading media on this topic. The letter from Lufthansa suggests that the passengers were not aware of the eventual crash and thus would not have experienced any fear of dying. Instead, they claim that the passengers would have experienced the event as a normal descent.

Would Lufthansa have us believe that during the captain’s alleged absence from the cockpit he would have interpreted such a descent in same way? After all, this absence took five minutes until the first six knocking sounds recorded by the cockpit voice recorder (from 09.30 to 09.35, according to the BEA report).

It is not proven and so is only assumed that the captain had gone the toilet, and it is also not proven that it was he who knocked on the cockpit door (it might well have been a flight attendant), since there are no video recordings from in front of the cockpit door.

Or maybe?

Another scenario: The Germanwings aircraft had no visual barrier (i.e., a curtain) blocking the view of the area immediately in front of the cockpit door. Thus, passengers would have easily witnessed what was occurring at the cockpit door. Then one would suspect that at least some passengers would have made pictures or videos of the events with mobile phones or cameras. In this case, there would be documented evidence of what was happening in the aircraft and, combined with the descent, passengers would likely have guessed and feared an impending crash and their deaths.

According to the information provided by victims’ lawyers, these devices were returned to the relatives with all images deleted, thus removing possibly critical evidence …

Now, in the autumn of 2019, a hearing will be held before the district court of Essen concerning the claims for compensation of the survivors. The payment amount should be based on the suffering of the passengers in the last few minutes before the fatal crash of the Germanwings aircraft.

In order to reach a fair judgment, the judges of the district court of Essen would actually have to demand and review the cockpit voice recorder as necessary evidence, but even more vital would be the images and video recordings from the mobile devices and cameras, provided they are available from the investigating authorities.

Pain and suffering compensation – an elastic term. Does money cure pain at all?

What role does the amount play?…

L.U.

further posts:

With regard to the Frontal 21 television report on 18 June 2019

Why were questionable, technically impossible operating parameters of the crashed Germanwings aircraft not examined?

Simultaneously set flight modes, which exclude each other; plus a newly implemented procedure to check the emergency code function of the cockpit door

Relevant data from an aircraft are stored on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and the flight data recorder (FDR). The cockpit voice recorder documents pilot voice communications as well as all cockpit sounds. The flight data recorder stores physical data, such as speed, altitude, etc., and also pilot settings on the autopilot control panel FCU (Flight Control Unit).

The recorders from the crashed Germanwings aircraft were found on separate days and the stored data retrieved. Graphical representations of the parameters taken from the flight data recorder are documented in the French investigation file. Aviation experts and pilots have examined these graphs and analysed them for plausibility. There are striking anomalies regarding different parameters. For example, see the following excerpt from the French investigation file:

Objektiver_Befund_franz_Orginal_Band_03_Blatt 803-1202 (HA 00924)

The graphs show the two automatic flight modes DES (Managed Descent) and OPDES (Open Descent). It can be seen that during the descent the two automatic flight modes DES (upper graph) and OPDES (lower graph) were simultaneously active.

As several Airbus A320 pilots have independently confirmed, having both settings concurrently active is technically impossible. For the Open Decent (OPDES) the altitude adjustment knob must be pulled out. For the Managed Decent setting, the same altitude knob must be pressed in. And when it is pushed in, the other mode is automatically disabled. Thus, it is completely impossible that both setting modes could have been active at the same time.

Another example of an anomaly can be found in the recording of the modes CLB (Managed Climb) and OPCLB (Open Climbs). See the following excerpt from the French investigation file:

Objektiver_Befund_franz_Orginal_Band_03_Blatt 803-1202 (HA 00924)

According to the graph, these two were also simultaneously active in the period from approx. 09:19 to 09:24. This is, again, techinically impossible.

Open Climb means that the engines are running at maximum thrust for the climb and the piot has selected the speed. In the Managed Climb mode the aircraft follows a speed and altitude profile which was previously stored in the Flight Management System. Open Climb is instigated by pulling out the altitude knob and Managed Climb by pressing in the altitude knob.

To repeat, when the altitude knob is pressed in the other mode is automatically disabled. And again, it is technically impossible that both mode settings could have been active at the same time. It should be noted that shortly after takeoff (see graph) at approximately 09:02 only the Managed Climb function was recorded as activated, and not both modes simultaneously.

But there is also an example where Airbus and Lufthansa became active only after the Germanwings crash and its consequences: The verification of the keypad function for accessing the cockpit.

Since the Germanwings crash, the keypad of the cockpit door and the proper function of the cockpit door locking system must be checked by the pilot once daily by entering the emergency code. Shortly after the aircraft accident there were indications from Germanwings insiders that the keypad of the Germanwings crashed aircraft had already malfunctioned previously in an attempt to open the unintentionally closed cockpit door on the ground by entering the emergency code. The door would not open after entering the code and entering the cockpit was only possible with the aid of Lufthansa technicians.

Mr van Beveren already personally reported this incident to the BEA on 28.03.2015, and also mentioned it in a telephone conversation with BEA spokeswoman Martine Del Bono. At the time he was acting as an independent aviation journalist to the BEA investigation authority. However, there followed no reaction or initiation of an investigation (see link, page 61).

https://andreas-lubitz.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Expert-Report-on-the-Crash-of-Germanwings-Flight-4U9525.pdf

Previously, the proper functioning of the emergency code was checked procedurally by Lufthansa technicians only every 12,000 flight hours.

From the Germanwings cockpit voice and sound recordings it is not apparent that the captain entered the emergency code. This prompts the legitimate question of, why not?

Furthermore, it has not been recorded or documented that the cockpit door was locked since the take-off in Barcelona until the collision in the mountains. See also article:

The deliberate lockout of the captain from the cockpit – The investigation file itself shows that this was not the case

Finally, the question persists as to why the questionable operating conditions of the crashed Germanwings aircraft have not been sufficiently investigated and clarified to definitively rule out that these circumstances could have contributed to the accident.

L.U.

further article:

The deliberate lockout of the captain from the cockpit

The deletion of potentially important evidence

Questions about the existence of photos / videos that do not fit the official crash scenario and changed crash time

According to the Germanwings investigation file, many mobile phones, of various makes, were found at the crash site. Some of them were undamaged. We all use mobile phones not only to make phone calls and send text messages, but also to take photos or create videos.

One can assume that on the salvaged mobile phones crash victims’ photos and videos of various kinds were stored. It is quite likely that passengers captured in photos or videos the last few minutes aboard the Germanwings plane. Especially in the first rows of seats, e.g. in the immediate vicinity of the cockpit door, the activities of the captain and the cabin crew would have been noticed by passengers, assuming they were conscious. Such photos and videos would provide critical proof in support of the official crash theory and would certainly have been presented in the investigation file. But these photos / videos are not available.

Personal items from the crash site which could be clearly identified immediately were soon handed over to the relatives. Included were several mobile phones. However, a representative for victims’ families from Spain, Paraguay and the United Kingdom, Narcis Motjé, publicly complained that SIM cards, possibly containing information on the course of events leading up to the crash, had been removed before the mobile phones were returned to the families.

See news article:

http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/germanwings-absturzopfer-verklagen-fluggesellschaft-a-1140692.html
(first read on 30.03.2017)

Victims’ lawyers representing other families also objected in a similar way, namely that photos and videos on the returned mobile phones had been deleted. Under these circumstances one must ask oneself, why had this been done? Did the Mirage fighter play a very different role? What could images or videos of a fighter aircraft, taken by Germanwings passengers, ultimately reveal? According to the investigation file (see page HA 04758) a Mirage fighter plane was indeed on the way. See the following excerpt from the file:

After the Centre National des Operations Aerienne de Lyon (CNOA) had been activated by Aix Air Traffic Control and the operational alert was triggered, a Mirage 2000, based in Orange, launched a search and rescue mission. When it arrived in the area a police helicopter was already present.

The Mirage reached the area, but only after the plane had already crashed… According to the official BEA Final Report, the Germanwings plane crashed at 09:41:06 (UTC) in the French Alps. (In March, Central European Time is one hour later than UTC.) The impact of the Germanwings plane was thus given as 10:41:06 local time. However, in the early media reports the crash time was reported as 10:53 am – 12 minutes later than what was recorded in the BEA Final Report. At 10:53 (!) on March 26, 2015, a minute of silence was held in North Rhine-Westphalia during which people remembered the victims of the catastrophe. At the same time, bells tolled in our town; at Cologne-Bonn Airport hundreds of Germanwings employees gathered at headquarters; and in Berlin the Federal Cabinet participated in this minute of silence. 10:53 was the moment when the radio transmission from the Germanwings’s plane was silenced by the impact.

See news article:

https://www.derwesten.de/thema/germanwings-absturz/nrw-haelt-inne-so-lief-die-schweigeminute-um-10-53-uhr-id10501602.html
(first read on 16.04.2015)

It is incomprehensible why, in retrospect, the crash time was brought forward from 10:53 to 10:41, and no one has asked why nor has anyone publically explained. Clearly, these facts raise serious questions: It is officially claimed that by 10:41 the Mirage fighter jet was unable to intercept the Germanwings plane, but it could have – 12 minutes later…

L. U.

further article:

Airworthiness Review Certificate – the ignored document