Category Archives: False investigation results

Why were the voice recordings of the cockpit voice recorder not clearly assigned?

The assignment of the captain’s and copilot’s voices was purely speculative

As in every Airbus A320, various microphones were installed in the cockpit of the crashed Germanwings plane and these recorded the audible activity on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR). Each microphone is assigned to a separate track on the CVR with a recording time of 30 minutes.

The various microphones record the verbal communication of the pilots in addition to any kind of noise in the cockpit. These sounds include, for example, alarms in the cockpit, adjustments to the control knobs (as far as they are acoustically perceptible), repositioning of the pilots’ seats, the closing and opening of the cockpit door, etc.

Even with acoustic recording of the opening and closing the cockpit door, it cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that someone indeed exits or enters. This would only be possible with video recordings, which do not exist.

On page HA 05111 of the French Investigative File (German translation) the following assignment of the microphones and recorded tracks were documented during the playback of the CVR on March 26, 2015 by gendarmes of the Air Traffic Gendarmerie SRTA Paris-Charles-De-Gaulle: “Tracks 1 and 2 correspond to the headsets of the captain and the copilot.” From this it can be concluded that track 1 is assigned to the captain and track 2 to the copilot.

However, later on page HA 05129 of the same investigation file, transcriptions of the CVR two days later on 28 March 2015 by gendarmes, four BEA engineers and a person of German descent at the Air Traffic Gendarmerie SRTA Paris-Charles-De-Gaulle, indicate that the microphones and thus the track assignments were the other way around. This is documented as follows:

Track 1: Copilot’s headset

Track 2: Captain’s headset

To prove beyond doubt and to ensure that the copilot, Andreas Lubitz, and the captain, Patrick Sondenheimer, were actually present in the cockpit during the last 30 minutes, a voice identification should have been carried out. For this, one would have a close relative (for example the co-pilot’s parents and the captain’s wife) listen to the CVR playback.

The reality was different: According to HA 05127, at the CVR listening session on 28 March 2015 at the Air Traffic Police SRTA Paris-Charles-De-Gaulle the following conclusion was reached: “As some tracks are difficult to understand, the session is interrupted to clarify the relevant voice excerpts. Due to the facts collected in these listening sessions, we can assume that the powerful voice captured by the various tracks is that of the flight captain.”

This is confirmed in a further session by gendarmes of the Aviation Gendarmerie SRTA Paris-Charles-De-Gaulle on 28 May 2015. On page HA 05266 of the French investigation file the following is documented: “We determine that the strong voice emanating from the various tracks is that of the captain, Mr. Sondenheimer, and Mr. Lubitz is the weak voice.”

From the point of view of Andreas Lubitz’s parents the following is noted:

  1. Andreas Lubitz had a normal male voice. The statement that he had a weak voice is purely speculative and unproven.
  2. Andreas Lubitz’s parents have applied to various institutions to listen personally to the cockpit voice recorder and thus to contribute to a voice identification. Specifically, these institutions were:
  • German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation
  • the Dusseldorf public prosecutor
  • BEA (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile) in France

All these requests were rejected with absurd and unreasonable explanations.

In response to a Lubitz family request, the Dusseldorf prosecutor informed them that neither he nor the BFU were ever in possession of the original cockpit voice records or a copy. The German investigation authorities were never provided with this important document of the accident investigation…

L.U.

 

further article:

Why were questionable, technically impossible operating parameters of the crashed Germanwings aircraft not examined?

Why were questionable, technically impossible operating parameters of the crashed Germanwings aircraft not examined?

Simultaneously set flight modes, which exclude each other; plus a newly implemented procedure to check the emergency code function of the cockpit door

Relevant data from an aircraft are stored on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and the flight data recorder (FDR). The cockpit voice recorder documents pilot voice communications as well as all cockpit sounds. The flight data recorder stores physical data, such as speed, altitude, etc., and  also pilot settings on the autopilot control panel FCU (Flight Control Unit).

The recorders from the crashed Germanwings aircraft were found on separate days and the stored data retrieved. Graphical representations of the parameters taken from the flight data recorder are documented in the French investigation file. Aviation experts and pilots have examined these graphs and analysed them for plausibility. There are striking anomalies regarding different parameters. For example, see the following excerpt from the French investigation file:

Objektiver_Befund_franz_Orginal_Band_03_Blatt 803-1202 (HA 00924)

The graphs show the two automatic flight modes DES (Managed Descent) and OPDES (Open Descent). It can be seen that during the descent the two automatic flight modes DES (upper graph) and OPDES (lower graph) were simultaneously active.

As several Airbus A320 pilots have independently confirmed, having both settings concurrently active is technically impossible. For the Open Decent (OPDES) the altitude adjustment knob must be pulled out. For the Managed Decent setting, the same altitude knob must be pressed in. And when it is pushed in, the other mode is automatically disabled. Thus, it is completely impossible that both setting modes could have been active at the same time.

Another example of an anomaly can be found in the recording of the modes CLB (Managed Climb) and OPCLB (Open Climbs). See the following excerpt from the French investigation file:

Objektiver_Befund_franz_Orginal_Band_03_Blatt 803-1202 (HA 00924)

According to the graph, these two were also simultaneously active in the period from approx. 09:19 to 09:24. This is, again, techinically impossible.

Open Climb means that the engines are running at maximum thrust for the climb and the piot has selected the speed. In the Managed Climb mode the aircraft follows a speed and altitude profile which was previously stored in the Flight Management System. Open Climb is instigated by pulling out the altitude knob and Managed Climb by pressing in the altitude knob.

To repeat, when the altitude knob is pressed in the other mode is automatically disabled. And again, it is technically impossible that both mode settings could have been active at the same time. It should be noted that shortly after takeoff (see graph) at approximately 09:02 only the Managed Climb function was recorded as activated, and not both modes simultaneously.

But there is also an example where Airbus and Lufthansa became active only after the Germanwings crash and its consequences: The verification of the keypad function for accessing the cockpit.

Since the Germanwings crash, the keypad of the cockpit door and the proper function of the cockpit door locking system must be checked by the pilot once daily by entering the emergency code. Shortly after the aircraft accident there were indications from Germanwings insiders that the keypad of the Germanwings crashed aircraft had already malfunctioned previously in an attempt to open the unintentionally closed cockpit door on the ground by entering the emergency code. The door would not open after entering the code and entering the cockpit was only possible with the aid of Lufthansa technicians.

Mr van Beveren already personally reported this incident to the BEA on 28.03.2015, and also  mentioned it in a telephone conversation with BEA spokeswoman Martine Del Bono. At the time he was acting as an independent aviation journalist to the BEA investigation authority. However, there followed no reaction or initiation of an investigation (see link, page 61).

https://andreas-lubitz.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Expert-Report-on-the-Crash-of-Germanwings-Flight-4U9525.pdf

Previously, the proper functioning of the emergency code was checked procedurally by Lufthansa technicians only every 12,000 flight hours.

From the Germanwings cockpit voice and sound recordings it is not apparent that the captain entered the emergency code. This prompts the legitimate question of, why not?

Furthermore, it has not been recorded or documented that the cockpit door was locked since the take-off in Barcelona until the collision in the mountains. See also article:

The deliberate lockout of the captain from the cockpit – The investigation file itself shows that this was not the case

Finally, the question persists as to why the questionable operating conditions of the crashed Germanwings aircraft have not been sufficiently investigated and clarified to definitively rule out that these circumstances could have contributed to the accident.

L.U.

 

further article:

The deliberate lockout of the captain from the cockpit

The deliberate lockout of the captain from the cockpit

The investigation file itself shows that this was not the case

Various press reports have claimed that there was an intentional lockout. This has led to the assumption that immediately after the captain left the cockpit Andreas locked the door. Over and over again pictures of the cockpit door locking system switch were commented on together with pictures of the UNLOCK-NORM-LOCK cockpit panel. Media websites displayed A320 locking system animations, always with the claim that Andreas had set the switch to «LOCK».

According to the BEA final report (see page 12) on the accident of the Germanwings plane, the cockpit door was opened at 09:30:24 and closed again three seconds later. These three seconds are when the captain supposedly exited the cockpit. This agrees with the transcript of the cockpit voice recorder protocol. See this following excerpt from the investigation file:

Objective findings German translation volume_03_page HA 05221:

Approximately four minutes later, at 09:34:31, a ringtone was recorded for one second. This sound indicates that someone outside the cockpit is requesting access. This is also evident from the BEA final report on page 13 and is consistent with the cockpit voice recorder transcript recordings (see excerpt below from the investigation file).

Objective findings German translation volume_03_page HA 05222:

However, the recording of the ringtone access request proves that Andreas had not deliberately locked the cockpit door. This is because if he had deliberately set the toggle switch to the LOCK position the entire cockpit door electronics, including the keypad and audible ringtones, would automatically have been deactivated for a period of 5 to 20 minutes, depending on the airline. Thus, no ringtone would have sounded and no ringtone could have been recorded. However, the fact that the ringtone was recorded is clear from the BEA final report. This clearly refutes the claim that by deliberately locking the cockpit door Andreas prevented the captain from entering!

Finally, reference should be made to finding no. 5 in the report on the crash of Germanwings Flight 4U9525 by Mr van Beveren:

https://andreas-lubitz.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Gutachten-zum-Germanwings-Absturz-4U9525-S-61-120.pdf

The assumption stated in the report and also by the public prosecutor, Brice Robin, on 26.03.2015 that Andreas Lubitz did »deliberately prevent the opening of the door« in order to deny access to the captain cannot be proven and is therefore purely speculative and was, in regards to the public statement, hastily stated by the prosecutor, Brice Robin.

Therefore, this assumption mentioned by Brice Robin is not based on any facts or evidence in the report.

L.U.

further article:

The deletion of potentially important evidence

Airworthiness Review Certificate – the ignored document

Why did this matter receive no attention?

A few days after the crash the public prosecutor assured us that the investigation would continue in all directions. Already during the preliminary investigation, the pro-government / pro-industry press published information found among Andreas Lubitz’s seized documents: a life-support document signed by him on 23.03.2015.

The press chose to interpret this document as indicative of a planned suicide and published this notion. But doesn’t this conclusion lack logic? One only creates an end-of-life-support document when expecting to continue living into the foreseeable future. And one would never expect to survive a planned airplane crash…

Another document that was signed the same day (23.03.2015) was given little or no attention by either the investigators or the media (understandably): Namely, the Airworthiness Review Certificate. For a commercial aircraft to operate safely and properly, it requires valid certification. The document that confirms it is in proper condition and performs safe flight operations is called an Airworthiness Review Certificate. According to the investigation file, the Airworthiness Review Certificate for the aircraft (D-AIPX) dated March 23, 2015, had expired – one day before the crash.
(See the following section of the original certificate from the investigation file)

However, it had been extended… According to Mr. van Beveren’s expert report, there are some important discrepancies. (See expert report, page 96 – 98). (Link to expert report)

Experts Report

• Under the current Regulation (EC) No 216/2008, an Airworthiness Review Certificate is valid for a maximum of one year.
• The previous certificate had been issued on 07.03.2014 and appears to be valid until 23.03.2015, i.e. until the day before the accident, so more than a year.
• There are certain special conditions for certification extension. However, such an extension is unusual – here, 16 days – and, strangely, at the time of the document’s issue in 2014.
• Apparently, the certification document with the LBA authorization number T512 was typed by the aircraft examiner, allegedly a Mr. or a Mrs. “Boussios”. However, the signature under this name does not match.
• According to the document, the certification took place on the day before the accident and was signed by Ferenc Dulai for Germanwings GmbH. The subsequent certification was to have been 11.03.2016 – 11 days before the allowable one-year expiration.
The curious 16-day extension beyond the one-year deadline was thus almost “compensated” for by the shortened time span before the next certification on 11.03.2016.

These discrepancies could have been checked through interrogations of the maintenance staff and those who were responsible through their signatures. Throughout the investigation file there is no evidence of the questioning of these people. From all this, it can be concluded that apparently the one document (the life-support statement) is given more importance because it supposedly implicates Andreas Lubitz as the culprit. The other document is “overlooked” in the file jungle, in order to shield…

Investigations in all directions? Clearly not.

L. U.

further article:

Considerations on the 2017 press conference

The reality behind Andreas’s health problems

Correction of false conclusions – the vision disturbances in 2015 were not recurrence of depression symptoms

For this report we have invested a bit longer time and have studied and evaluated the relevant pages from the investigation files. In the end we came to the conclusion not to judge single medical aspects, because if taken out of context they would justify the opinions of those who believe they know better. In nearly the last three years certain medical specialists have responded to requests for their views and have volunteered their opinions and analyses regarding Andreas Lubitz’s personality, without ever having met him or come to know him. Any good psychiatrist or psychologist knows that “remote diagnosis”, as in this case, followed by evaluation and judgement, requires care, as this can only lead to a subjective conclusion. The BFU, also, has as yet not found it necessary to correct the demonstrably false conclusions which they had previously reported to the French authorities. It is true that in 2008/2009 Andreas experienced an episode of depression. However, it is also true that by the middle of 2009 he had overcome this episode and was perfectly healthy, which was certified several times. What is untrue is that he was ever hospitalized for depression treatment. What is also untrue is that from 2008 to 2015 Andreas was in the continuous care of a psychiatrist and received medication. In July of 2009, after ending medication and thorough examinations by an aviation doctor and a psychiatrist, he was cleared to resume his flight education in September. Furthermore, the medical history form was correctly filled out by Andreas for his medical flight certificate. One just has to read these pages accurately and not intentionally misinterpret their content, which was unscrupulously done by victims’ lawyers who were looking, on behalf of their clients, for the needle in a haystack in order to attach blame to anything or anyone. We were surprised by the number of doctors who Andreas consulted within a seven-year period. It should also be pointed out that during this period Andreas lived in three different locations. Up to 2015, none of the doctors were psychiatrists or psychologists, but were all general practitioners and dentists, orthopedists, ears-nose- throat specialists and ophthalmologists. These last made up the majority of doctor consultations and mainly took place in 2015. We do not know exactly what caused Andreas‘s eye problems, insomnia, etc., and have only our guesses. But we exclude (as we always have) a recurrence of the depression in 2015 because of our experiences in 2008/2009. It is obvious to associate the symptoms Andreas spoke about with his earlier depressive episode, if one has no other explanation. Unfortunately, most doctors (psychiatrists and psychologists included) have no knowledge of the existing problem of “aerotoxic syndrome”, so they are unable to diagnose it after excluding any organic disorder. For most affected people things go badly, also without a medical history. Knowing what we know today – that a certain number of predisposed persons are not able to reduce the toxins, or require a long time for reduction, then consequentially suffer lifelong nerve damage – we would have discouraged Andreas from becoming a pilot, dream job or not. Specific medical examinations of our family members have provided unexpected, but unmistakable, results.

Everyone who flies (including passengers), can become an affected person. In this connection we would like to refer to the following link so that you can make up your own mind. Help for those affected should be different, shouldn‘t it?

https://www.change.org/p/9899447/u/22070243utm_medium=email&utm_source=petition_update&utm_campaign=197729&sfmc_tk=EQofcVA4Ss%2f2Le2JY11OoMElClnho%2b4Ybng9Nv4G%2fWW4Dy13wO6K8v0iM82twciK&j=197729&sfmc_sub=195850815&l=32_HTML&u=36535400&mid=7259882&jb=78

L.U.

Evaluation of Andreas’s flight logbook:

Evaluation of Andreas’s flight logbook

24 March 2015 – The day of the crash

In the investigation file, the following description can be found on page HA 09803: (Topic: Examination of the witness (Andreas Lubitz’s girlfriend) on 26.03.2015, here as “supplemental” to the initial interrogation).

Non-facts from the investigation file

“In response to whether she had taken things from her boyfriend’s parents’ house in Montabaur, she makes the following statements: On the day of the crash she had waited for his return in Düsseldorf with her boyfriend’s parents. When the delay of the machine became longer, she told the parents that it would not be worthwhile waiting (it is not possible to discover if she had knowledge of the crash at that point in time). For this reason they drove together to Montabaur. There, she gathered random things of her boyfriend’s and packed them in a bag.”

The facts are

The girlfriend never made these statements! It appears in the file as a supplement to her interrogation and is not signed by her. This raises the question of why detective chief superintendent G. wrote it and placed it in the file.

The true events

On 24 March 2015 Andreas Lubitz’s father was at a business meeting in Eindhoven, Netherlands, as evidenced by the minutes of that meeting. His wife telephoned him there about the Germanwings crash. At that time nobody knew for certain whether Andreas Lubitz was on that flight. Andreas Lubitz’s mother and brother drove together from Montabaur to Düsseldorf airport to determine whether he was on board. At Düsseldorf airport they were greeted by Germanwings / Lufthansa employees and a pastor, who are witnesses to their arrival. Mrs. Lubitz received the news that her son was co-pilot of the crashed machine and immediately telephoned her husband. He ended his business meeting and drove to Düsseldorf airport to meet his family. The girlfriend was at work at the relevant time, as colleagues can testify, and came later with her stepfather to Düsseldorf airport where she was also received by employees of the crisis team (also witnesses) and was taken to join the Lubitz family. After completing the formalities, the Lubitzes and the girlfriend with her step-father departed in their own cars, just as they had come. There was no shared ride to Montabaur! Nor did the girlfriend remove any items from Andreas Lubitz’s room in the family home in Montabaur. This fact alone is absurd, as she had lived with Andreas in their shared apartment in Düsseldorf for almost a year and it would be illogical for her to remove any items. Furthermore, she never entered the Lubitz home on the night in question.

Consequences of misrepresentations

These absolutely untrue “facts” placed in the investigation file prompted relatives and their legal advisors to alert the press, who sensationalized false interpretations and conclusions and widely disseminated them to the public.
For examples of this sensationalism, see the following links:

http://www.stern.de/panorama/weltgeschehen/germanwings-absturz–vater-im-interview—-wie-lange-ich-das- durchhalte–weiss-ich-nicht–7372608.html
https://www.nrz.de/staedte/duesseldorf/duesseldorfer-kaempft-nach-germanwings-absturzum-wahrheit-id12058964.html

All of the untruths were never corrected by the Düsseldorf Public Prosecutor, although we drew his attention to it. Why not?