Category Archives: False investigation results

Objective consideration of the results of the investigation

That Andreas Lubitz caused the crash of the Germanwings plane on 24 March 2015 in the French Alps on the flight from Barcelona to Düsseldorf is found in many news reports and is based upon the following allegations by the investigating bodies:

He had locked the cockpit door after the captain left the cockpit.
He would have been depressed and on sick leave on 24 March 2015.
He had searched an iPad for ways to commit suicide and researched cockpit access codes.
He had deliberately initiated the final descent of the Germanwings plane.

The attempt to verify these allegations are based on the more than 21,000 pages of investigation files of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor and the Marseille public prosecutor’s office as well as the BEA (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile) final report of the accident investigation.

The cockpit door that cannot be opened

In various reports on the Germanwings crash, it was said that the co-pilot had locked the cockpit door to lock out his colleague. In the BEA final report, German version, it is noted on page 38(1) that at the time of the pilot’s return the buzzer signal and another noise were recorded on the CVR (Cockpit Voice Recorder). However, the BEA final report clearly states that this other noise is not compatible with pilot manipulation of the cockpit door locking system. The BEA thus disproved that the pilot in the cockpit could have intentionally locked the door. The BEA goes on to make the statement in its final report that the pilot “did not open the cockpit door and thus prevented other persons from accessing the cockpit”(2).

The question arises, why did the pilot not open the cockpit door? In this context, page HA 04310 of the investigation file of the Germanwings crash documents demonstrates what the result of the CVR recording revealed with regard to the condition of the co-pilot present in the cockpit(3).

“Listening to the various recording channels revealed that breathing could be heard through the mouth microphones, which meant that he was alive, although it was not possible to prove whether he was also conscious.”

In his expert report on the Germanwings crash the author, journalist and aviation expert Tim van Beveren comes to the conclusion that the pilot was incapable of acting or was unconscious in the cockpit(4). In this case, however, the cockpit door can be opened by entering on the keypad a three-digit emergency code which every crew member knows. There were indications from Germanwings employees that the keypad of the aircraft involved in the accident had a defect that made it impossible to successfully enter the emergency code, and thus the cockpit door could not be opened despite any attempt to enter the code(5).

It should be noted that four microphones are recorded on the four tracks of the CVR. Each pilot has his own microphone attached to the headset. There is an area microphone, which picks up sounds and noises from the entire cockpit. And on the jumpseat (seat for an additional crew member) is another headset with microphone.
According to investigation file HA 05266, the allocation of tracks of the co-pilot and captain by officers of the Air Traffic Gendarmerie SRTA Paris Charles De Gaulle was as follows:

• “Track 1 corresponds to a high-quality recording of the last 30 minutes of the co-pilot’s headset.
• Track 2 corresponds to a high-quality recording of the last 30 minutes of the flight captain’s headset.”(6)

Accordingly, the investigation assigned track 1 to the co-pilot and track 2 to the captain. However, this clearly contradicts the Airbus manual, the Flight Crew Operating Manual and the Airbus wiring diagrams of the crashed Germanwings aircraft D-AIPX. This original Airbus wiring diagram clearly shows that

• the CVR track 1 is assigned to the captain and not to the co-pilot, and
• the CVR track 2 is assigned to the co-pilot and not to the captain.

This raises the question of who actually remained in the cockpit, the co-pilot or the captain? Voice identification with the captain’s wife and the co-pilot’s parents to clarify this discrepancy was never carried out.

The conclusion is that the co-pilot or captain did not manually activate the “lock function” for the cockpit door. He was incapacitated or unconscious in the cockpit. However, the captain or co-pilot was also unable to open the cockpit door by entering the emergency code because the keypad had a defect.

Was Andreas Lubitz depressed and on sick leave on March 24, 2015?

In December 2014, Andreas Lubitz noticed problems with his eyes and consulted various doctors. In keeping with his character, he not only sought the help of a doctor but always sought at least a second medical opinion.
His family doctor, who could not initially determine a cause, referred him to various eye specialists, but no eye disease could be found. The family doctor, therefore, developed the theory that it could be a psychosomatic illness and referred Andreas Lubitz to appropriate specialists, such as psychiatrists and psychologists. The psychiatrist who treated Andreas Lubitz for his depressive episode in 2008 and 2009 issued a specialist medical certificate on 29 January 2015, see page HA 10309(7) of the investigation file. It explicitly states:

“The patient named above appears to be completely healthy from a psychiatric point of view. There is no indication of a psychiatric disease. Regarding illness, Mr. Lubitz does not have a higher risk than the average population.”

However, the family doctor maintained her suspected diagnosis of a psychosomatic cause and wrote Andreas Lubitz off sick from 22.2.2015 to 24.2.2015 due to sleep and visual disturbances and finally initiated an appropriate examination and treatment in the direction of psychosis on 10.3.2015. For the periods of taking medication, Andreas Lubitz had a corresponding certificate of incapacity to work, which he also presented to his employer.

The family doctor issued a certificate of incapacity for work from 12.3.2015 to 30.3.2015 on 12.3.2015. By 18.3.2015, however, the situation had not improved. The family doctor was on vacation and so Andreas Lubitz went to the practice of the substitute doctor. This substitute doctor ended the erroneous treatment in the direction of psychosomatic illness, phased out the medication and wrote Andreas Lubitz off sick for this phasing-out period from 18.3.2015 to 22.3.2015. The amended certificate of incapacity for work was dutifully handed over to the employer, Germanwings, on 18 March 2015, see HA 10594(8), certificate of incapacity for work for submission to the employer. The certificate of incapacity for work also bears the receipt stamp of Germanwings. A copy of the old certificate of incapacity to work until 30 March 2015, issued by the family doctor, was found torn up in Andreas Lubitz’s flat, see HA 09570(9), as it was now obsolete and was only intended to be presented to the health insurance company and not to the employer.

However, in the press conference of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office on 27 March 2015, public prosecutor Dr. Kumpa presented these investigation results as if Andreas Lubitz had not presented the certificate of incapacity for work to his employer but had destroyed it in order to conceal his illness. According to public prosecutor Dr. Kumpa, the torn certificate of incapacity for work found during the house search of the Düsseldorf flat was proof of this.

The bottom line, however, is that Andreas Lubitz did not hide his illness from his employer. This is clear from the documentation of the certificates of incapacity for work that had been duly submitted. Andreas Lubitz was last thoroughly examined by a general practitioner as late as 18.03.2015 and was given written sick leave up to and including 22.03.2015. Previously issued certificates for a longer period of time were thus obsolete. In addition, as a psychiatrist testified, Andreas Lubitz was neither suicidal nor suffering from any form of psychiatric illness.

The iPad search

In the press conferences held by the prosecutor of Düsseldorf, Dr. Kumpa, he mentioned that an iPad had been found with which Andreas Lubitz had searched for ways to commit suicide, medication information and also cockpit code access. However, the investigation file with its more than 21,000 pages refutes this statement by Dr. Kumpa.

According to the search and seizure protocol, see HA 09578(10), an iPad was seized during the search of Andreas Lubitz’s flat in Düsseldorf on 26 March 2015. In a file note, supplement to the police search on 26.03.2015, see HA 09581(11), it is stated that by mistake in the seizure report the number of iPads found and seized was listed as one (1). It is confirmed that the actual number of iPads was two (2). However, the criminal investigation department, which examined both iPads, found nothing “relevant to the proceedings” (HA 08916(12), HA 08910(13)), so both iPads were inconspicuous. One of the iPads belonged to Andreas Lubitz and the other to his partner.

According to HA 09803(14), Andreas Lubitz’s partner handed over another tablet or iPad to the Düsseldorf criminal investigation department after being questioned as a witness on 26 March 2015. Thus, there were now three iPads among the evidence at the Düsseldorf criminal investigation department. On this third iPad the Düsseldorf criminal investigation department found search terms such as “suicide”, “buy cyanide”, “chloroquine suicide” after reviewing the internet history on 18/19.03.2015, and that on 20.03.2015, among others, the keywords “code cockpit door” were searched for, see HA 08923(15).

According to the interrogation protocol, however, the criminal police did not question the partner about why the iPad was not found during the search of the joint flat; where it was at that time; where it was during the entire time in question when the search and seizures were carried out; and who had used it. The fact that the third iPad was not found during the search of the flat and was only handed over later by his partner makes it clear that the device was apparently not under the control of Andreas Lubitz nor had it been in his flat. Why was it not determined where the device was during the period in question? Who had the device from when to when? According to the investigation file, there is no evidence of an investigation.

Could it be that the search for the cockpit door access code was carried out by another person, inspired by a TV report on the current use of cockpit access codes (as also noted by the Criminal Investigation Department in the printout of the web searches on page HA 08930(16): “Report shows code for cockpit door on TV”)? Why should Andreas Lubitz look for cockpit door access code information on the internet, as he was certainly informed of it by his airline and therefore knew it anyway? Even if the two iPads directly seized during the home search did not have any contents relevant to the proceedings, the history of the use of these devices would be of crucial importance. If, for example, the iPad had been used by Andres Lubitz at the times when the third iPad, which was handed over later, was also used, then it would be ultimately clear that the third iPad was not used by Andreas Lubitz and that the online searches apparently incriminating him could not have been credited.

However, all these open questions were not comprehensively investigated and must therefore be considered unresolved. How can it be that the criminal investigation department as well as the public prosecutor’s office did not question the partner either on 26.3.2015 or later on the use and the user of the third iPad? Why was it not precisely clarified whether this iPad had been accessible to Andreas Lubitz at all? Why doesn’t the investigation file explicitly state where it was actually located between 3/16/2015 and 3/26/2015 and who was using it? Why does the investigation file not explicitly state when the other two iPads were used?

So how could the investigation simply arbitrarily assign this web history to Andreas Lubitz without having explored and verified the context of these searches? The criminal police and the public prosecutor’s office seem to have jumped to the conclusion, without any factual basis, that Andreas Lubitz would have operated the iPad during that time and carried out these searches without even remotely considering, checking and ruling out other possibilities.

The bottom line is that the conclusions of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office are devoid of any factual basis, i.e. they are pure conjecture and therefore completely worthless for evidentiary proceedings.

Who initiated the last descent of the D-AIPX?

In the BEA final report, German version of 13 March 2016, it is documented on page 13: “At 09:30:53 (point 4), the set altitude on the FCU (Flight Control Unit) changed from 38,000 ft to 100 ft within one second. This is the minimum value that can be set on the A320.”(17) It is assumed that the co-pilot caused the change in altitude by interfering with the FCU. To verify this, the transcript of the cockpit voice recorder protocol will be used. On the transcript of the cockpit voice recorder log, page HA 05280(18), at 09:30:53, there is no documented noise indicating an adjustment of the flight level at the aircraft controls. Thus, it is not documented that the co-pilot set the altitude at 100 feet. The reduction in altitude within one second from 38,000 ft to 100 ft at 09:30:53 must therefore have been implemented by the Flight Management System without manual intervention by a pilot. This phenomenon has already occurred several times before and after the Germanwings crash.

Extensively documented is an incident at the Australian airline Quantas, flight 72, on 7 October 2008. An Airbus A330, whose control interfaces are identical to the crashed Germanwings Airbus, was on a flight over the Indian Ocean to Perth, Western Australia. Suddenly and without warning it descended twice. In this incident 119 of the 315 passengers and crew on board were injured, 12 of them seriously, see Australian Transport Safety Bureau report “In-flight upset 154 km west of Learmonth, WA 7 October 2008 VH-QPAAirbus A330-303″(19)

As the Australian Transport Safety Bureau stated in its investigation, it is highly likely that defective data packets were sent via the data bus to the fly-by-wire electronic aircraft control system. This triggered the stall protection and the Airbus was sent without warning into descent by the Flight Management System. The three pilots on board were able to intervene and the aircraft continued the flight.

Another documented incident occurred on 19 March 2017. “On Mar 19th 2017 a Germanwings A319 enroute began an uncommanded descent two times.”(20)

The Germanwings Airbus A319-100 D-AGWG, equipped with the same flight control systems as the crashed Germanwings Airbus, twice went into a descent after several unexplained mode changes not initiated by the pilots. The intervention of the crew prevented the aircraft from descending further. These incidents demonstrate that Airbus aircraft can descend uncontrollably without warning and without human intervention in the aircraft controls. Disasters could only be prevented by the skilled intervention of pilots.

The conclusion is that it is highly probable that this phenomenon of uncontrolled descent also occurred on Germanwings flight 9525. Tragically, the pilot remaining in the cockpit was unable to act and the other pilot was unable to open the cockpit door to intervene. As a result, the Germanwings Airbus crashed in the French Alps.

Conclusion

If one analyses the four so-called facts, they do not stand up to factual scrutiny. This shows how superficially and inaccurately the investigations were conducted and how clear indications in another direction were overlooked or ignored with preconceived opinion.

L. G.

References

(1) Excerpt from page 38, BEA Final Report, German version of 13 March 2016
https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elyextendttnews/BEA2015-0125.de-LR_04.pdf
(2) Excerpt from page 122, BEA Final Report, German version of 13 March 2016
https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elyextendttnews/BEA2015-0125.de-LR_04.pdf
(3) Excerpt from page HA 04310 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(4) Excerpt from page 109, expert report of the crash of Germanwings flight 4U9525, Tim van Beveren
https://andreas-lubitz.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Gutachten-zum-Germanwings-Absturz-4U9525-S-61-120.pdf
(5) Excerpt from page 98, expert report of the crash of Germanwings flight 4U9525, Tim van Beveren
https://andreas-lubitz.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Gutachten-zum-Germanwings-Absturz-4U9525-S-61-120.pdf
(6) Excerpt from page HA 05266 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(7) Excerpt from page HA 10309 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(8) Excerpt from page HA 10594 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(9) Excerpt from page HA 09570 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(10) Excerpt from page HA 09578 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(11) Excerpt from page HA 09581 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(12) Excerpt from page HA 08916 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(13) Excerpt from page HA 08910 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(14) Excerpt from page HA 09803 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(15) Excerpt from page HA 08923 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(16) Excerpt from page HA 08930 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(17) Excerpt from page 13, BEA Final Report, German version of 13 March 2016
https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elyextendttnews/BEA2015-0125.de-LR_04.pdf
(18) Excerpt from page HA 05280 of the investigation file of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office
(19) http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/3532398/ao2008070.pdf
(20) https://avherald.com/h?article=4aad6354&opt=0

References_Objective consideration of the results of the investigation

further posts:

What conclusions do the investigation results allow so far?

What conclusions do the investigation results allow so far?

Experience has shown that aircraft accident investigations take several years. In case of the Germanwings airplane crash in the French Alps the investigating prosecutor Brice Robin announced after only two days: The copilot deliberately crashed the aircraft. When the captain left the cockpit, the copilot initiated a descent. The copilot did not allow the captain to reenter the cockpit. Prior to these announcements there had been a first listening of the cockpit voice recorder by the French gendarmerie. However, to prove beyond doubt who, in fact, was in the cockpit a voice identification should have been carried out. In order to confirm the identity of the speakers the cockpit voice recorder data should have been played to the copilot’s parents and the captain’s wife. However, this was not done. Instead, it was assumed that the “strong” voice belonged to the captain and the “weak” voice was that of the copilot.

Therefore, it was presumed that it was the copilot who had locked out the captain.
Thus, intentional actions by the copilot were assumed. In reference to the pilot remaining in the cockpit, on page HA 04310 of the investigation report it is documented:

“Listening to the various recording channels revealed that breathing could be detected from a headset microphone, which means that he was alive, although there was no evidence that he was conscious.”

This means that there is no evidence of conscious or even deliberate actions, only that the recorded breathing showed that he was alive.

It was also assumed that the pilot remaining in the cockpit consciously and intentionally initiated the descent. However, the recordings do not reveal any sounds up to the moment of impact that would indicate a pilot’s active manipulations of the aircraft controls.

Various press articles reported that the copilot suffered from depression in 2015.
On page HA 10309 of the investigation file there is a medical certificate from January 29, 2015 – less than two months before the crash – in which the following is certified by a specialist in psychiatry and psychotherapy (see screenshot):

“The patient named above appears to be completely healthy from a psychiatric point of view. There is no indication of a psychiatric disease.
Regarding illness, Mr. Lubitz does not have a higher risk than the average population.”

By the constant repetitions of unsubstantiated allegations, large parts of the public have been convinced of the copilot’s guilt and his responsibility for the crash of the Germanwings aircraft. However, this is not reflected in the facts of the accessible investigation reports.

L.G.

further posts:

The cockpit door that cannot be opened

What can we expect on the fifth anniversary?

Will new insights find their way into media coverage?

The fifth anniversary of the tragic and life-altering event of 24 March 2015 is coming up soon. It can be assumed that the media will publish reports regarding the catastrophe and the circumstances around it. The numerous reports of the past five years have nearly always included the following two key messages:

1. The co-pilot intentionally locked the cockpit door.
2. The co-pilot was depressed at the time of the crash.

However, over these intervening five years these statements have become untenable. As our readers know, we have indicated this in various articles on this website and provided the corresponding evidence.

Regarding point 1 above, it has not been proven that the co-pilot deliberately locked the cockpit door. For unknown reasons, the door was not opened (see link below).

https://andreas-lubitz.com/en/2018/08/ “The deliberate lockout of the captain from the cockpit”

Regarding point 2, according to the investigative findings of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor the co-pilot did not suffer from depression at the time of the crash (see link below).

https://andreas-lubitz.com/en/2019/01/ ” Current developments – Renewed lawsuit by families’ lawyer”

The statement by the renowned journalist and author Ulrich Wickert is absolutely remarkable:
“80 percent of the reports on the 27-year-old have been proven to be false” (see link below).

https://andreas-lubitz.com/en/2019/02/

Nonetheless, the press representatives have repeated these unsubstantiated claims in their reports like a prayer wheel, without incorporating new and contradictory information. We can infer that behind these repeated falsehoods there lies the clear intention to sustain the publicized image of “The Depressed Co-pilot Who Locked the Cockpit Door.” If journalists were to investigate the cumulative findings and incorporate them into their reports, they then would necessarily have to address the question: Could the cause of the crash have been different?

Doubts about the official version were raised in December 2019, when reports were released that the victims’ cell phones were returned to the families but with audio and video data deleted.

Further questions immediately arise: “Is there something to hide? And if so, what?”

Let us hope that on the fifth anniversary journalists will educate themselves with the current available information and move from the established storyline to a degree of enlightenment, which will lead to the objective reporting we expect from responsible media. A “No Comment” response from authorities does not entitle them to maintain the established storyline unrestrictedly and uncritically.

L.U.

further post:

Christmas peace 2019?

With regard to the Frontal 21 television report on 18 June 2019

Between claims and reality

A Frontal 21 television report on 18 June reported on the Germanwings crash. According to its own statement, Frontal 21 claims to uncover grievances, stimulate discussions and “get to the bottom of” certain topics. But the broadcast on Germanwings demonstrated precisely the opposite: The themes were poorly researched and many statements wrong, as the examples below show.

Cockpit door locked from the inside https://andreas-lubitz.com/en/2018/08/

In the broadcast the following statement is made: “Andreas Lubitz sat alone for several minutes in the cockpit, had locked the door from the inside, locking out the flight captain”.

As we have already shown in our August 2018 article (see above link), it is verifiably established that the cockpit door was not locked from inside. It is noteworthy, however, that despite having the emergency access code crew members could not open the cockpit door. If for some reason the door is not manually unlocked from the inside, the cockpit can be opened by entering the correct code on the keypad. Mr van Beveren, who prepared an expert report on the Germanwings crash (on our behalf), had learned that shortly after the accident, hints from Germanwings insiders indicated that this keypad had already malfunctioned in an earlier incident: On the ground, the cockpit door was accidentally shut and automatically locked but could not be opened using the keypad. This is an important clue that you, Frontal 21, should have investigated.

Depression https://andreas-lubitz.com/en/2019/01/

Also, the programme says: “At first glance, Andreas Lubitz appears sporty and fit, but suffered from depression and sleep and anxiety disorders”. At the time of the crash Andreas did not suffer from depression, as prosecutor Kumpa concluded (see above link).

The closing note of the Düsseldorf prosecutor states: “On the one hand, according to the results of the investigation, there are no indications that Andreas Lubitz was mentally ill when he was hired as a flight attendant and later as a pilot at Germanwings.” And further, it was determined: “None of the treating physicians in 2014/2015 — be they psychiatric specialists or other doctors – diagnosed depression with Andreas Lubitz at that time. In addition, no physician or therapist detected suicidal thoughts or were any reported by the patient. There was also no evidence of atypical aggressive behavior.”

Andreas Lubitz did not suffer from depression at the time of the crash.

Indeed, Andreas was treated from November 2008 to April 2009 for depression, seven years before the crash, and had reported this to his employer (i.e., Lufthansa). After recovering in 2009, he was invited by the flight school to continue his training, and completed it successfully. In all broadcasts so far the question is always raised about how someone with such an illness could be allowed into the cockpit. Unsurprisingly, it is brought up again by a family member in the Frontal 21 programme.

It should be said once again that Andreas had completely recovered in 2009, otherwise he would not have been able to start his training again. And let us add that as parents we would not have allowed our child to continue flying and perhaps sacrifice him as a consequence.

We have tried to explain the possible cause of his eye problem 2014/2015 in an article from October 2017 (see link above). https://andreas-lubitz.com/en/2017/10/

As it can directly affect every passenger, should not the civil aviation topic described there be given more public attention?

Final remarks

The Frontal 21 broadcast talks about so-called “inevitable consequences”.

It is stated that the four-eyes principle (i.e., always at least two people in the cockpit) was introduced in 2015, but as the policy went almost completely unnoticed by the flying public it was abolished two years later. Furthermore, in their final report the French investigators demand clear rules for doctors as to whether and when it is necessary to overrule “physician/patient confidentiality” without them having to fear legal consequences. Lawyer Ulrich von Jeinsen, who represents relatives, criticizes the fact that this has not happened so far. Obviously, the responsible authorities do not see any need for action and consider such new measures (also demanded by the relatives) to be unproductive. Well, perhaps a suitable measure would be to search again elsewhere for the real reasons for the crash.

All in all, this contribution by Frontal 21 was poorly researched, just a renewed rewarming of previously communicated content, and thus completely superfluous.

L.U.

further posts:

Comprehensive investigations of the crash cause?

Current developments – Renewed lawsuit by family’s lawyer

Giemulla provides the German Press Agency (dpa) with “news” about an expanded lawsuit in which he argues with false facts

So it starts again! The driving force is once again the family lawyer Giemulla. Under the pressure of the statute of limitations, this reworked lawsuit has recently been filed. This information submitted to dpa would ensure a wide distribution in the media landscape. Is this the way to put to rest this tragic story? Why would one do something like this, and what does one want to achieve?

Perhaps one wants to exert further pressure on Lufthansa in order to collect even greater compensation payments. One hopes for a bombshell story in the media which would increase this pressure on the airline, which may then be more willing to pay so that its name can again disappear from the negative headlines.

From the words of attorney Giemulla one can see that it is a lawsuit brought by 200 relatives of 49 victims and demands more than double what was originally paid by Lufthansa. 200 relatives of 49 victims is an average of four relatives per victim! He argues that the suit is not only about money, but is also about clarification about where the airline failed. But it is difficult to believe that. Incidentally, the fact that the general public shares this disbelief is confirmed by the articles’ comments sections. Furthermore, the articles and comments were published only by regional newspapers or broadcasters – not by the leading media.

So far, we have always been very reserved in our choice of words, but today we would like to make it clear: Attorney Giemulla sticks to his lies and changes his narrative at the expense of our son. It is simply not true that Andreas was able to finish his flight training only with a special permit. (About this we have already written in detail in our article of September 2017, which can be read in the archive.)

Why would a lawyer employ such methods? Or in other words, is it Giemulla’s intention to constantly renew and sustain the image of the mentally ill copilot and, if so, why, and on whose behalf and in whose interest? Of course, he is also under pressure, because another attorney obtained larger payments for his clients on the condition that the charges against the Lufthansa Group were dropped.

https://www.stern.de/panorama/klageerweiterung-germanwings-absturz–angehoerige-wollen-mehr-schmerzensgeld-8520070.html

According to the cited STERN article: “Giemulla demands an inspection of the flight school records. He also wants to personally interview witnesses in the US in order to prove negligence. The overall concern of the bereaved was in addition to the monetary compensation, and that this would come through clarification. “At what point in the global corporation did the mentally ill copilot slip through the control network?” the lawyer asked”.

With this statement Giemulla once again claims, as he did in 2017, that our son belongs to the permanently mentally ill. This is absolutely contrary to all the investigation results. The following is from the closing statement of the Düsseldorf prosecutor, Kumpa:

“On the one hand, according to the results of the investigation, there are no indications that Andreas Lubitz was mentally ill when he was hired as a flight attendant and later as a pilot at Germanwings.”

And further it is stated:

Later he added: “None of the treating physicians in 2014/2015 — be they psychiatric specialists or other doctors — diagnosed depression with Andreas Lubitz at that time. In addition, no physician or therapist detected suicidal thoughts or were any reported by the patient. There was also no evidence of atypical aggressive behavior.”

And then there is the question: In the course of his work as a lawyer, is Giemulla entitled to demand access to files from the flight school or to hear witnesses? Is not that the job of prosecutors or judges? And this is quite apart from the fact that witness hearings were already carried out by the US authorities and are part of the investigation file. Should he be entitled to do so? If so, then he will hear nothing negative or distressing from anybody in the US. Regarding this we are absolutely confident, as no abnormalities or omissions would be found. The time in Arizona is the highlight of the training for all Lufthansa pilots. That’s what it was for our son. And Andreas was the first to finish this part of his training and with good results, without any special permission.

Provided that Giemulla performed a thorough study of the files, he would have to be aware of these facts, but this is seriously doubtful in view of his false claims.

If the public finally understood that the story of “the mentally ill copilot” was never true, then we would be left without a plausible explanation.

And then victims, relatives, lawyers, the investigating authorities, the public, etc., would begin asking questions about the real cause of the crash and must then consider alternative scenarios.

L.U.

Why were the voice recordings of the cockpit voice recorder not clearly assigned?

The assignment of the captain’s and copilot’s voices was purely speculative

As in every Airbus A320, various microphones were installed in the cockpit of the crashed Germanwings plane and these recorded the audible activity on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR). Each microphone is assigned to a separate track on the CVR with a recording time of 30 minutes.

The various microphones record the verbal communication of the pilots in addition to any kind of noise in the cockpit. These sounds include, for example, alarms in the cockpit, adjustments to the control knobs (as far as they are acoustically perceptible), repositioning of the pilots’ seats, the closing and opening of the cockpit door, etc.

Even with acoustic recording of the opening and closing the cockpit door, it cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that someone indeed exits or enters. This would only be possible with video recordings, which do not exist.

On page HA 05111 of the French Investigative File (German translation) the following assignment of the microphones and recorded tracks were documented during the playback of the CVR on March 26, 2015 by gendarmes of the Air Traffic Gendarmerie SRTA Paris-Charles-De-Gaulle: “Tracks 1 and 2 correspond to the headsets of the captain and the copilot.” From this it can be concluded that track 1 is assigned to the captain and track 2 to the copilot.

However, later on page HA 05129 of the same investigation file, transcriptions of the CVR two days later on 28 March 2015 by gendarmes, four BEA engineers and a person of German descent at the Air Traffic Gendarmerie SRTA Paris-Charles-De-Gaulle, indicate that the microphones and thus the track assignments were the other way around. This is documented as follows:

Track 1: Copilot’s headset

Track 2: Captain’s headset

To prove beyond doubt and to ensure that the copilot, Andreas Lubitz, and the captain, Patrick Sondenheimer, were actually present in the cockpit during the last 30 minutes, a voice identification should have been carried out. For this, one would have a close relative (for example the co-pilot’s parents and the captain’s wife) listen to the CVR playback.

The reality was different: According to HA 05127, at the CVR listening session on 28 March 2015 at the Air Traffic Police SRTA Paris-Charles-De-Gaulle the following conclusion was reached: “As some tracks are difficult to understand, the session is interrupted to clarify the relevant voice excerpts. Due to the facts collected in these listening sessions, we can assume that the powerful voice captured by the various tracks is that of the flight captain.”

This is confirmed in a further session by gendarmes of the Aviation Gendarmerie SRTA Paris-Charles-De-Gaulle on 28 May 2015. On page HA 05266 of the French investigation file the following is documented: “We determine that the strong voice emanating from the various tracks is that of the captain, Mr. Sondenheimer, and Mr. Lubitz is the weak voice.”

From the point of view of Andreas Lubitz’s parents the following is noted:

Andreas Lubitz had a normal male voice. The statement that he had a weak voice is purely speculative and unproven.
Andreas Lubitz’s parents have applied to various institutions to listen personally to the cockpit voice recorder and thus to contribute to a voice identification. Specifically, these institutions were:

German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation
the Dusseldorf public prosecutor
BEA (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile) in France

All these requests were rejected with absurd and unreasonable explanations.

In response to a Lubitz family request, the Dusseldorf prosecutor informed them that neither he nor the BFU were ever in possession of the original cockpit voice records or a copy. The German investigation authorities were never provided with this important document of the accident investigation…

L.U.

further article:

Why were questionable, technically impossible operating parameters of the crashed Germanwings aircraft not examined?

Why were questionable, technically impossible operating parameters of the crashed Germanwings aircraft not examined?

Simultaneously set flight modes, which exclude each other; plus a newly implemented procedure to check the emergency code function of the cockpit door

Relevant data from an aircraft are stored on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and the flight data recorder (FDR). The cockpit voice recorder documents pilot voice communications as well as all cockpit sounds. The flight data recorder stores physical data, such as speed, altitude, etc., and also pilot settings on the autopilot control panel FCU (Flight Control Unit).

The recorders from the crashed Germanwings aircraft were found on separate days and the stored data retrieved. Graphical representations of the parameters taken from the flight data recorder are documented in the French investigation file. Aviation experts and pilots have examined these graphs and analysed them for plausibility. There are striking anomalies regarding different parameters. For example, see the following excerpt from the French investigation file:

Objektiver_Befund_franz_Orginal_Band_03_Blatt 803-1202 (HA 00924)

The graphs show the two automatic flight modes DES (Managed Descent) and OPDES (Open Descent). It can be seen that during the descent the two automatic flight modes DES (upper graph) and OPDES (lower graph) were simultaneously active.

As several Airbus A320 pilots have independently confirmed, having both settings concurrently active is technically impossible. For the Open Decent (OPDES) the altitude adjustment knob must be pulled out. For the Managed Decent setting, the same altitude knob must be pressed in. And when it is pushed in, the other mode is automatically disabled. Thus, it is completely impossible that both setting modes could have been active at the same time.

Another example of an anomaly can be found in the recording of the modes CLB (Managed Climb) and OPCLB (Open Climbs). See the following excerpt from the French investigation file:

Objektiver_Befund_franz_Orginal_Band_03_Blatt 803-1202 (HA 00924)

According to the graph, these two were also simultaneously active in the period from approx. 09:19 to 09:24. This is, again, techinically impossible.

Open Climb means that the engines are running at maximum thrust for the climb and the piot has selected the speed. In the Managed Climb mode the aircraft follows a speed and altitude profile which was previously stored in the Flight Management System. Open Climb is instigated by pulling out the altitude knob and Managed Climb by pressing in the altitude knob.

To repeat, when the altitude knob is pressed in the other mode is automatically disabled. And again, it is technically impossible that both mode settings could have been active at the same time. It should be noted that shortly after takeoff (see graph) at approximately 09:02 only the Managed Climb function was recorded as activated, and not both modes simultaneously.

But there is also an example where Airbus and Lufthansa became active only after the Germanwings crash and its consequences: The verification of the keypad function for accessing the cockpit.

Since the Germanwings crash, the keypad of the cockpit door and the proper function of the cockpit door locking system must be checked by the pilot once daily by entering the emergency code. Shortly after the aircraft accident there were indications from Germanwings insiders that the keypad of the Germanwings crashed aircraft had already malfunctioned previously in an attempt to open the unintentionally closed cockpit door on the ground by entering the emergency code. The door would not open after entering the code and entering the cockpit was only possible with the aid of Lufthansa technicians.

Mr van Beveren already personally reported this incident to the BEA on 28.03.2015, and also mentioned it in a telephone conversation with BEA spokeswoman Martine Del Bono. At the time he was acting as an independent aviation journalist to the BEA investigation authority. However, there followed no reaction or initiation of an investigation (see link, page 61).

https://andreas-lubitz.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Expert-Report-on-the-Crash-of-Germanwings-Flight-4U9525.pdf

Previously, the proper functioning of the emergency code was checked procedurally by Lufthansa technicians only every 12,000 flight hours.

From the Germanwings cockpit voice and sound recordings it is not apparent that the captain entered the emergency code. This prompts the legitimate question of, why not?

Furthermore, it has not been recorded or documented that the cockpit door was locked since the take-off in Barcelona until the collision in the mountains. See also article:

The deliberate lockout of the captain from the cockpit – The investigation file itself shows that this was not the case

Finally, the question persists as to why the questionable operating conditions of the crashed Germanwings aircraft have not been sufficiently investigated and clarified to definitively rule out that these circumstances could have contributed to the accident.

L.U.

further article:

The deliberate lockout of the captain from the cockpit

The deliberate lockout of the captain from the cockpit

The investigation file itself shows that this was not the case

Various press reports have claimed that there was an intentional lockout. This has led to the assumption that immediately after the captain left the cockpit Andreas locked the door. Over and over again pictures of the cockpit door locking system switch were commented on together with pictures of the UNLOCK-NORM-LOCK cockpit panel. Media websites displayed A320 locking system animations, always with the claim that Andreas had set the switch to «LOCK».

According to the BEA final report (see page 12) on the accident of the Germanwings plane, the cockpit door was opened at 09:30:24 and closed again three seconds later. These three seconds are when the captain supposedly exited the cockpit. This agrees with the transcript of the cockpit voice recorder protocol. See this following excerpt from the investigation file:

Objective findings German translation volume_03_page HA 05221:

Approximately four minutes later, at 09:34:31, a ringtone was recorded for one second. This sound indicates that someone outside the cockpit is requesting access. This is also evident from the BEA final report on page 13 and is consistent with the cockpit voice recorder transcript recordings (see excerpt below from the investigation file).

Objective findings German translation volume_03_page HA 05222:

However, the recording of the ringtone access request proves that Andreas had not deliberately locked the cockpit door. This is because if he had deliberately set the toggle switch to the LOCK position the entire cockpit door electronics, including the keypad and audible ringtones, would automatically have been deactivated for a period of 5 to 20 minutes, depending on the airline. Thus, no ringtone would have sounded and no ringtone could have been recorded. However, the fact that the ringtone was recorded is clear from the BEA final report. This clearly refutes the claim that by deliberately locking the cockpit door Andreas prevented the captain from entering!

Finally, reference should be made to finding no. 5 in the report on the crash of Germanwings Flight 4U9525 by Mr van Beveren:

https://andreas-lubitz.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Gutachten-zum-Germanwings-Absturz-4U9525-S-61-120.pdf

The assumption stated in the report and also by the public prosecutor, Brice Robin, on 26.03.2015 that Andreas Lubitz did »deliberately prevent the opening of the door« in order to deny access to the captain cannot be proven and is therefore purely speculative and was, in regards to the public statement, hastily stated by the prosecutor, Brice Robin.

Therefore, this assumption mentioned by Brice Robin is not based on any facts or evidence in the report.

L.U.

further article:

The deletion of potentially important evidence

Airworthiness Review Certificate – the ignored document

Why did this matter receive no attention?

A few days after the crash the public prosecutor assured us that the investigation would continue in all directions. Already during the preliminary investigation, the pro-government / pro-industry press published information found among Andreas Lubitz’s seized documents: a life-support document signed by him on 23.03.2015.

The press chose to interpret this document as indicative of a planned suicide and published this notion. But doesn’t this conclusion lack logic? One only creates an end-of-life-support document when expecting to continue living into the foreseeable future. And one would never expect to survive a planned airplane crash…

Another document that was signed the same day (23.03.2015) was given little or no attention by either the investigators or the media (understandably): Namely, the Airworthiness Review Certificate. For a commercial aircraft to operate safely and properly, it requires valid certification. The document that confirms it is in proper condition and performs safe flight operations is called an Airworthiness Review Certificate. According to the investigation file, the Airworthiness Review Certificate for the aircraft (D-AIPX) dated March 23, 2015, had expired – one day before the crash.
(See the following section of the original certificate from the investigation file)

However, it had been extended… According to Mr. van Beveren’s expert report, there are some important discrepancies. (See expert report, page 96 – 98). (Link to expert report)

Experts Report

• Under the current Regulation (EC) No 216/2008, an Airworthiness Review Certificate is valid for a maximum of one year.
• The previous certificate had been issued on 07.03.2014 and appears to be valid until 23.03.2015, i.e. until the day before the accident, so more than a year.
• There are certain special conditions for certification extension. However, such an extension is unusual – here, 16 days – and, strangely, at the time of the document’s issue in 2014.
• Apparently, the certification document with the LBA authorization number T512 was typed by the aircraft examiner, allegedly a Mr. or a Mrs. “Boussios”. However, the signature under this name does not match.
• According to the document, the certification took place on the day before the accident and was signed by Ferenc Dulai for Germanwings GmbH. The subsequent certification was to have been 11.03.2016 – 11 days before the allowable one-year expiration.
The curious 16-day extension beyond the one-year deadline was thus almost “compensated” for by the shortened time span before the next certification on 11.03.2016.

These discrepancies could have been checked through interrogations of the maintenance staff and those who were responsible through their signatures. Throughout the investigation file there is no evidence of the questioning of these people. From all this, it can be concluded that apparently the one document (the life-support statement) is given more importance because it supposedly implicates Andreas Lubitz as the culprit. The other document is “overlooked” in the file jungle, in order to shield…

Investigations in all directions? Clearly not.

L. U.

further article:

Considerations on the 2017 press conference

The reality behind Andreas’s health problems

Correction of false conclusions – the vision disturbances in 2015 were not recurrence of depression symptoms

For this report we have invested a bit longer time and have studied and evaluated the relevant pages from the investigation files. In the end we came to the conclusion not to judge single medical aspects, because if taken out of context they would justify the opinions of those who believe they know better. In nearly the last three years certain medical specialists have responded to requests for their views and have volunteered their opinions and analyses regarding Andreas Lubitz’s personality, without ever having met him or come to know him. Any good psychiatrist or psychologist knows that “remote diagnosis”, as in this case, followed by evaluation and judgement, requires care, as this can only lead to a subjective conclusion. The BFU, also, has as yet not found it necessary to correct the demonstrably false conclusions which they had previously reported to the French authorities. It is true that in 2008/2009 Andreas experienced an episode of depression. However, it is also true that by the middle of 2009 he had overcome this episode and was perfectly healthy, which was certified several times. What is untrue is that he was ever hospitalized for depression treatment. What is also untrue is that from 2008 to 2015 Andreas was in the continuous care of a psychiatrist and received medication. In July of 2009, after ending medication and thorough examinations by an aviation doctor and a psychiatrist, he was cleared to resume his flight education in September. Furthermore, the medical history form was correctly filled out by Andreas for his medical flight certificate. One just has to read these pages accurately and not intentionally misinterpret their content, which was unscrupulously done by victims’ lawyers who were looking, on behalf of their clients, for the needle in a haystack in order to attach blame to anything or anyone. We were surprised by the number of doctors who Andreas consulted within a seven-year period. It should also be pointed out that during this period Andreas lived in three different locations. Up to 2015, none of the doctors were psychiatrists or psychologists, but were all general practitioners and dentists, orthopedists, ears-nose- throat specialists and ophthalmologists. These last made up the majority of doctor consultations and mainly took place in 2015. We do not know exactly what caused Andreas‘s eye problems, insomnia, etc., and have only our guesses. But we exclude (as we always have) a recurrence of the depression in 2015 because of our experiences in 2008/2009. It is obvious to associate the symptoms Andreas spoke about with his earlier depressive episode, if one has no other explanation. Unfortunately, most doctors (psychiatrists and psychologists included) have no knowledge of the existing problem of “aerotoxic syndrome”, so they are unable to diagnose it after excluding any organic disorder. For most affected people things go badly, also without a medical history. Knowing what we know today – that a certain number of predisposed persons are not able to reduce the toxins, or require a long time for reduction, then consequentially suffer lifelong nerve damage – we would have discouraged Andreas from becoming a pilot, dream job or not. Specific medical examinations of our family members have provided unexpected, but unmistakable, results.

Everyone who flies (including passengers), can become an affected person. In this connection we would like to refer to the following link so that you can make up your own mind. Help for those affected should be different, shouldn‘t it?

https://www.change.org/p/9899447/u/22070243utm_medium=email&utm_source=petition_update&utm_campaign=197729&sfmc_tk=EQofcVA4Ss%2f2Le2JY11OoMElClnho%2b4Ybng9Nv4G%2fWW4Dy13wO6K8v0iM82twciK&j=197729&sfmc_sub=195850815&l=32_HTML&u=36535400&mid=7259882&jb=78

L.U.

Evaluation of Andreas’s flight logbook:

Evaluation of Andreas’s flight logbook